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1 Introduction
Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2006) analyze conditions for policy invariance and
equilibrium existence in a LQ Nash game, using the concept of controllability of
an economic system introduced by Tinbergen (1952, 1956). Their equilibrium
conditions generalize the well-known su¢ cient conditions stated by Dasgupta
and Maskin (1986).
Their analysis, however, does not consider the possibility of a convergence
of interests between di¤erent players, i.e., the formation of implicitcoalitions
among players sharing the same target values of some variables. When we
take account of the possible absence of a conict among some players (with a
residual opposition among groups of them), issues of existence of an equilibrium
(or multiplicity of equilibria) and policy invariance can be dealt with in more
general terms by means of the same theoretical tools introduced in the classical
theory of economic policy.
We are grateful to Maria Chiarolla and Andrew Hughes Hallett for helpful comments on
a previous draft.
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2 The model
We consider an economy where agents interact strategically. This economy is
described by the following linear system:
Ax = Bu =
MX
i=1
Biui (1)
where x is a vector of N target variables; u is a vector of M instruments set
by the agents; A, B are appropriate matrices (respectively of order N N and
N M). We assume that A and B are of full rank, i.e. targets and instruments
are both linearly independent (e.g., Petit, 1990: 33). We also assume that
the total number of instruments is not greater than the total number of target
variables (i.e. M  N).1
Note that we indicate matrices with uppercase letters, vectors with lowercase
and the i-th element (column) of a vector (matrix) with a subscript.
Each agent j aims at minimizing a quadratic criterion dened on the devia-
tion from a desired target vector (x (j)):2
L (j) = (x  x (j))0 Q (j) (x  x (j)) (2)
where Q (j) is a positive semi-denite diagonal matrix, which represents the
weights that the agent places on deviations from the desired targets. We do not
require that Q (j) is of full rank as one agent may not be interested in one or
more target variables. The agents j rst best is obtained for x = x (j); as a
consequence L (j) = 0.
The weights that player j associates to deviations from his targets are in-
dicated by vector q (j), i.e. the diagonal of Q (j). Thus qk (j) is the weight
associated by player j to the deviation from his k-th target.
We assume that each agent is endowed with only one instrument; then there
are M agents.3 This assumption is not restrictive at all; the case of an agent
who is endowed with more than one instrument can be simply introduced by
assuming more agents minimizing the same criterion. We also assume that
the instrument set by agent i is e¤ective on his target variables; this formally
requires
 
A 1Bi
0
Q (i) 6= 0, for all i. The assumption simply implies that each
player is active in the game; otherwise his reaction function would not exist.
3 Coalition controllability
Before analyzing the issues of existence, multiple equilibria and policy invari-
ance, we need to introduce some preliminary concepts.
1This assumption is introduced to rule out the trivial case that would lead to either innite
Nash equilibria or non existence (for a formal discussion see Acocella et al., 2008).
2For the sake of brevity, without loss of generality, the criterion is assumed to be strictly
quadratic. See Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004) for a discussion.
3 Index i and j can then be used in an interchangeable manner.
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Denition 1 (Implicit coalition) We dene an (implicit) coalition, C(X),
associated to a given set of values for some (or all) target variables, X, as the
set of agents for whom X contains their rst best.
Given the x(i) for i = 1:::M , there is a nite set of sets of values for target
variables that individuate a coalition, we denote by 
 this set and indicate by
XZ a generic element of it, i.e. XZ 2 
 for all Z. Each XZ can contain from
1 to N elements. Since we have assumed that some agents may be interested
only in subsets of target variables, we can have implicit coalitions formed by
agents each with a di¤erent number of target variables.4 Moreover, notice that
implicit coalitions can be formed also by only one agent.
We must stress that our concept of implicit coalition does not imply any kind
of cooperative solution. In particular, the concept is di¤erent from that arising
from a coalition Nash equilibrium or those associated with other endogenous
coalition models. In a coalition Nash equilibrium, agents usually play a two-
stage game. In the rst stage they negotiate the formation of coalitions and
 in case  sign a binding agreement to play the second stage as a coalition
against other players or coalitions.5 By contrast, when we consider the idea
of implicit coalitions, each agent always acts non-cooperatively and coalitions
just naturally emerge from the absence of conict among their members; no
commitment mechanism is thus advocated.
Now, we can formally dene the conict of interests.
Denition 2 (Conict of interests) We say that two coalitions C(X1) and
C(X2) have a conict of interests if there exists at least a desired target value k
such that xk(i) 6= xk(j) with qk (i) 6= 0, qk (j) 6= 0 for i 2 C(X1) and j 2 C(X2).
Less formally, a conict of interests between two coalitions means that X1
and X2 contain at least one di¤erent target value for the same variable in which
they are both interested.
It is useful to extract from the matrix of policy multipliers, A 1B, only those
relevant for the members of coalition C(XZ). We thus dene matrix M(XZ)
as the matrix obtained from A 1B by keeping only the rows corresponding
to the target variables included in XZ and the columns corresponding to the
instruments of the coalition players. The order of matrix M(XZ) is given by
the dimension of XZ and the cardinality of C(XZ). We also dene a matrix
of members weights for the coalition C(XZ) as a matrix where each row j
is the vector q(j) of member j of C(XZ). From this matrix we obtain the
matrix Q(XZ) by deleting the columns corresponding to the target variables
not included in XZ . The order of matrix Q(XZ) is given by the cardinality of
C(XZ) and the dimension of XZ .
Finally, we dene controllability.
4For instance, XZ = fx2 = 5; x3 = 7g 2 
 is a the set that contains the rst best of
player i and j if they aim to minimize L (i) = q2 (i) (x2   5)2 and L (j) = q2 (j) (x2   5)2 +
q3 (j) (x2   7)2. In this case they are both members of the implicit coalition C(XZ).
5Di¤erent equilibrium concepts can be dened according to the way players form expec-
tations about the behavior of other players. See, among others, Chwe (1994) and Ray and
Vohra (1999).
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Denition 3 (Coalition controllability) A coalition is said to satisfy coali-
tion controllability if the strategies of coalition members always imply that they
reach their rst best outcomes for any given strategy of the other players.
Coalition controllability implies that a combination of instruments of the
coalition members (coalition policy) exists such that, for any given set of values
for the instruments chosen by non-coalition members, the coalition members
always achieve their rst best outcomes. Coalition controllability is assured by
the conditions stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Coalition controllability) A coalition C(XZ) satises coali-
tion controllability if 1) M(XZ) is of full column rank; 2) M (XZ)
0 Q (XZ) is of
full column rank, where denotes the element by element product (Hadamard
product).
Proof. Given the policies of non-coalition members, if condition 1) is satis-
ed the coalition XZ faces a sub-system of the economy that is controllable
in the Tinbergen terms (by a unique decision-maker). A policy assuring that
xZ   xZ = 0 thus exists, where xZ   xZ are the deviations from the target
values included in XZ . However, coalition members play in a non-cooperative
manner, i.e. each member sets one instrument separately; then it is not ob-
vious that they can implement this policy. Their rst order conditions are 
A 1Bi
0
Q (i) (x  x (i)) = 0 for all i 2 C (XZ) and can be written in a com-
pact form as

M (XZ)
0 Q (XZ)

(xZ   xZ) = 0. This system has a unique
solution equal to xZ = xZ , if the matrix

M (XZ)
0 Q (XZ)

is left-invertible.
This occurs if condition 2) is satised.
It is worth noting that coalition controllability is obtained without any kind
of cooperation among the (implicit) coalition members.
Coalition controllability clearly generalizes the traditional Tinbergen and
Theil conditions to the case of multiple players, augmenting the traditional
results with an implementation requirement. Condition 1) in fact simply means
that the coalition has a number of independent instruments greater or equal
to its independent targets, while condition 2) implies that the agents always
independently implement the Tinbergen policy.
4 Existence, policy invariance andmultiple equi-
libria
The concept of coalition controllability can be used to derive interesting prop-
erties about uniqueness of the equilibrium, indeed (su¢ cient) conditions for
multiple equilibria.
Theorem 5 (Multiple equilibria) In a game where at least an equilibrium
exists, multiple equilibria arise if the cardinality of a controlling coalition C(XZ)
is greater than the dimension of XZ .
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Proof. The proof is trivial. Assume that an equilibrium exists; if the cardi-
nality of C(XZ) is greater than the dimension of XZ , there are other innite
combinations of the policies of coalition members supporting their rst best
outcomes, given the policy of non coalition members. All these combinations
will also be Nash equilibria.
Multiple equilibria always emerge when there is a too numerouscontrol-
ling coalition, i.e. a controlling coalition with more members (i.e.instruments
for our assumption) than targets. This means that, even if no player has more
instruments than targets, the controlling coalition faces an overdetermined prob-
lem and, since its members play in a non-cooperative manner, they have the
problem of coordinating their action towards one of the rst best equilibria.6
This result complements that obtained by Acocella et al. (2008), who consider
a game where M > N .7
The case of excess of instruments, which represents a richness in the Tin-
bergen world of a unique decision-maker (or a centralized solution), is thus
cumbersome for a Nash equilibrium. This problem of multiple equilibria would
nd a natural accommodation in the focal point approach or with a central-
ization of policy and is likely to be more relevant if M is large. Alternative
solutions can be related to the idea of correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974).
The concept of coalition controllability can be also used to derive necessary
conditions for Nash equilibrium existence.
Theorem 6 (Existence) A Nash equilibrium does not exist if there is a con-
ict of interests between two controlling coalitions.
Proof. Assume that an equilibrium exists and there are two controlling coali-
tions, C(X1) and C(X2), with conicting interests. Taking as given the equi-
librium values for the agents who do not belong to the coalitions, by denition,
coalition controllability implies that the equilibrium satises xk = xk(i) for any
k such that qk (i) 6= 0 for all the members of the two coalitions. However,
the denition of the conict also implies that there are at least two agents, j
and h, for whom: xk(j) 6= xk(h) with qk (j) 6= 0, qk (h) 6= 0 and j 2 C (X1),
h 2 C (X2). Thus no equilibrium can exist.
The nature of the conditions stated by the theorem must be clear. It shows
su¢ cient conditions for non existence and thus necessary conditions for exis-
tence of a Nash equilibrium. As for non existence, they are more general than
those contained in Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2006) and reduce to these for
controlling coalitions formed by only one player. They extend the case of non
existence to situations where some agents having conicting target values do
6The same problem arises in the battle of sex, when both players only care of being together.
7Specically, Acocella et al. (2008) show that if M > N , any given vector x could be
obtained by an appropriate combination of policies, since the system would be controllable
in Tinbergens terms. But if x were consistent with a Nash equilibrium, there would be
innite many combinations of instruments supporting it, independently of the player who sets
them (the system, in fact, would be globally over-determined), and therefore, innite Nash
equilibria would arise. Multiple equilibria, however, would emerge only in the case of equal
target values for the players; in general no equilibrium would exist.
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not control them individually, but through the coalitions they belong to. As for
existence, they are more stringent than Acocella and Di Bartolomeos (2006):
for an equilibrium to exist, in fact, one needs to rule out the existence of a
conict not only between individual players but also between coalitions.
Finally, we can use the above discussion to derive some su¢ cient conditions
for policy invariance as in Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004). Before, however,
this must be dened, as in a game context the traditional denition cannot be
used because policies are endogenous. The classical denition of policy neu-
trality in fact implies that autonomous changes in the policy instrument have
no inuence on some outcomes. In the realm of policy games, the following
denition of neutrality can be accepted: When the equilibrium values of some
outcomes do not depend on the preferences of the policymaker, policy is neutral
with respect to such outcomes (Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 2004).
If an equilibrium exists, policy invariance emerges when there is at least
one controlling coalition, C(XZ), not including all players. In this case all
the variables dened in XZ will be xed by the coalition and changes in the
preference parameters of the non-coalition members cannot a¤ect them. Hence
their policies will be neutral with respect to the target variables dened in
XZ . If this was not the case, i.e., if players outside the coalition were able to
reach (control) their targets, a contradiction would arise with the assumption
of controllability by the coalition of di¤erent targets.
5 Conclusions
This paper has started from the notion of existence or absence of a conict
among the players in a policy game. If the latter is the case, implicit coali-
tions can be formed among the players sharing the same target values of some
variables. The traditional tools of controllability introduced by Tinbergen with
respect to a single decision-maker can be extended to implicit coalitions in a pol-
icy game and properties of Nash equilibrium derived. In a nutshell, the existence
of a conict implies an opposition among the (implicit) coalitions that leads to
the non existence of an equilibrium when more than one coalition controls con-
icting targets. If only one coalition controls the economic system, this implies
policy invariance. Issues of multiple equilibria and coordination problems arise
when a coalition has more instruments than targets available.
References
Acocella, N., Di Bartolomeo, G., 2004. Non-neutrality of monetary policy in
policy games. European Journal of Political Economy 20, 695-707.
Acocella, N., Di Bartolomeo, G., 2006. Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Con-
trollability in policy games. Economics Letters 90: 213-218.
Acocella, N., Di Bartolomeo, G., Hughes Hallett A.J., 2008. The existence of
6
Nash equilibria in n-player LQ-games, with applications to international
monetary and trade agreements. Working Paper No 40, Department of Com-
munication, University of Teramo.
Aumann, R. 1974. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Jour-
nal of Mathematical Economics 1, 67-96.
Chwe, M., 1994. Farsighted coalitional stability. Journal of Economic Theory
63: 299-325.
Dasgupta, P., Maskin, E., 1986. The existence of the equilibrium in discontinu-
ous economic games, I: Theory. Review of Economic Studies 53, 1-26.
Petit, M.L., 1990. Control theory and dynamic games in economic policy analy-
sis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Preston, A.J., Pagan, A.R., 1982. The theory of economic policy. Statics and
dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Ray, D., Vohra, R., 1999. A theory of endogenous coalition structures. Games
and Economic Behaviour 26, 286-336.
Tinbergen, J., 1952. On the theory of economic policy. Amsterdam, North Hol-
land.
Tinbergen, J., 1956. Economic policies. principles and design. Amsterdam,
North Holland.
7
